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James E. Campbell setbacks.' First, investigations of its hypotheses about individual voting behavior produced findings that contradicted the theory (Arseneau and Wolfinger 1973; Kernell 1977; and later, Cover 1985) . Subsequent research, however, revised the theory to accommodate these individual-level findings (Campbell 1987) . Second, the development of the referenda theory of midterm elections effectively displaced the theory of surge and decline as the explanation of midterm losses by the president's party (Tufte 1975 (Tufte , 1978 Kernell 1977; Born 1986 ; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth 1986; Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986). Again, however, the effect of the referenda theory's emergence on the theory of surge and decline is set in perspective by subsequent research. An analysis of both the referenda theory and the theory of surge and decline indicates that they are quite compatible (Campbell 1985) . The compatibility of the two theories was actually first suggested by Tufte (1975, 826) in his original formulation of the referenda theory.
Although previous research examined separately the presidential surge and its midterm decline over various periods of history, both surge and decline effects on national congressional election results have not been examined over an extended series of elections. This note examines a single equation model of the presidential explanation of congressional election vote and seat change. The hypothesis examined within this single equation is that a party's presidential vote positively affects the change in its share of votes and seats in presidential election years and negatively affects the change in its shares of votes and seats in the following midterm elections.
DATA AND VARIABLES
The surge and decline hypothesis is tested with national election returns for the entire series of elections from 1868 to 1988. This includes a total of 61 congressional election years, 31 held in presidential election years and 30 held in midterm years. In order to cover all bases, electoral change is examined in terms of seat change for the parties as well as change in the nationally aggregated congressional vote. National congressional vote data are from Stokes and Iversen's series (Niemi and Fett 1986 ) up until 1976. The congressional vote split since 1976 and the national partisan division of seats data are drawn from Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (1990). Both the vote and seat data are adjusted to reflect a division between the two major parties. Also, for the 'There were also other reasons for the fading of the theory of surge and decline from conventional wisdom. Among these are: (1) the less obvious and apparently weakened coattail effects in recent presidential elections, (2) the greater variance in the midterm congressional vote than in the on-year congressional vote (Jacobson and Kernell 1981, and Erikson 1988) , and (3) the greater emphasis placed on local factors in congressional races (Mann 1978 , Ragsdale 1980 ). None of these developments, however, is critical to the theory of surge and decline (see Campbell 1990). sake of comparability, the seat data have been adjusted because of the growth in the total number of seats in the House over time. The adjusted data reflect a constant House size of 435 members.2
The principal independent variable is an interaction of two variables. The first element is the two-party division of the popular presidential vote for the Democratic presidential candidate minus 50%. This indicates both the direction and magnitude of the presidential surge. The second element is a variable indicating whether the election is a presidential year or midterm election. Since the presidential surge is hypothesized to have a positive effect in presidential years, this variable has a value of plus one in these cases. The hypothesized negative effects of the prior presidential surge in midterms is reflected in this variable taking a value of minus one in midterm elections. The interaction of these two variables reflects the notion that big surges should be followed by big declines and that small presidential surges should be followed by small declines.
In general, the presidential vote margin of the two-party popular vote reflects the relative appeal of the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. However, in elections with a substantial third-party presidential vote, the two-party division of the presidential vote may not reflect shortterm presidential forces quite so well. If the third-party presidential vote was not proportionately at the expense of the major parties, then the twoparty vote may be misleading. 4The prior midterm seat and vote levels are used for both presidential and midterm election years. The prior midterm holdings rather than that of the previous presidential election are used for midterm elections so that the effects of the presidential surge will not be obscured. A party's seat holdings in a presidential election year are composed partly of their holdings from the prior midterm and partly from the effects of presidential coattails. Therefore, if holdings in the presidential year were used, some of the losses from that level would be a consequence of the winning presidential party having more votes and seats to lose because they had won the presidency. From this view, the "exposure" model of congressional seat change simply identifies an intervening variable in the theory of surge and decline (Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Waterman 1990). The president's party loses seats in the midterm because it is consistently overexposed in midterm elections and it is consistently overexposed in midterms because it gained coattail seats in the prior presidential election.
5The New Deal dummy variable was included in keeping with Angus Campbell's (1966, 61) original argument that surge and decline effects should not be expected during a critical realignment such as that which took place in the early 1930s. Other treatments of the New Deal elections were also examined. Neither dropping the dummy variable nor dropping the elections themselves appreciably changed the estimated effects of surge and decline. 4. The final independent variable takes into account the possibility of a "midterm penalty" for the president's party above and beyond that exacted by the decline from the prior presidential surge. A variety of midterm referenda theories (Kernell 1977; Tufte 1975 Tufte , 1978 Erikson 1988) suggest that the midterm electorates generally punish the president's party.6 Whether a result of unfulfilled expectations or the greater motivation of negative evaluations, there is an expectation that the incumbent president's party is punished in the midterm. To allow for this possibility, a variable reflecting the president's party was included in the equation. In midterm elections, the variable was assigned a value of one when the president was a Democrat and negative one when the president was a Republican. Democrat and negative one when the president was a Republican. Presidential election years are assigned a value of zero. A midterm penalty should be indicated by a negative coefficient. Although there are strong surge and decline effects evident in this analysis, midterm losses by the president's party are not entirely explained by the absence of the prior presidential surge or coattails. In addition to losses attributable to the aftermath of the presidential surge, the president's party in the midterm typically has lost a bit more than 2% of the congressional vote and about 27 or 28 seats. These losses apparently are a consequence of public disappointments with the incumbent presidential party's performance during its first two years in office.
While this represents a substantial midterm penalty, it still should be clear that a large portion of midterm losses for the president's party are a result of the prior presidential surge. This is reflected in the typical midterm losses for the president's party estimated both with and without the presidential surge and decline variable. Without the presidential vote variable, the typical presidential midterm penalty was more than four percentage points of the congressional vote and about 44 seats. However, after taking the decline of presidential short-term forces into account, the midterm penalty (presumably due to negative public evaluations of the incumbent party) was cut nearly in half.9 DISCUSSION Throughout American history, as the above analysis clearly demonstrates, congressional elections have been shaped by the surge and decline of presisize, though it seems plausible that the presidential party could save some residual of their presidential year gains; (2) The unavoidable omission of midterm presidential approval ratings would probably lead to the underestimation of surge and decline effects, assuming that presidential candidates who win by larger margins tend to be the popular presidents two years later at the midterm elections. 9Strictly speaking, the president's party at the midterm variable does not explain why the president's party typically loses these extra votes and seats. We presume that they may be explained, in whole or only in part, by some combination of the "negative voting" (Kernell 1977) and "midterm referendum" (Tufte 1975 ) explanations. However, we do not have a reliable indicator of these explanations for the entire election series. A previous analysis of more recent midterms indicates that the referendum explanation and the presidential surge and decline explanation were quite compatible. dential elections. Congressional elections held concurrently with presidential elections are influenced by those presidential contests, to the advantage of the party winning the presidency. Congressional elections held in midterms are not subject to this influence. As a result, the presidential party that had enjoyed the benefits of presidential coattails now suffers congressional losses when its candidates must run without assistance from the top of the ticket.
While the effects of surge and decline on congressional elections is evident for the series of elections since the end of the Civil War, there remains the concern that surge and decline effects may have weakened or disappeared in recent years (Calvert and Ferejohn 1983 The answer to this question is in two parts, First, even though the swings of surge and decline are of smaller amplitude than in the past, they are still evident. The winning presidential party in most cases still gains votes and seats in on-years and loses votes and seats in midterms. Moreover, these recent surge and decline effects are more clearly evident in multivariate analyses (Campbell 1985 (Campbell , 1986a (Campbell , and 1990 Second, the weakening of surge and decline effects does not mean that they will necessarily disappear. Whether surge and decline effects vanish depends upon the reasons they have already weakened. Three interrelated reasons for weakened effects seem plausible: partisan dealignment, the increased incumbency advantages, and the wasting of presidential coattails (Campbell 1990 ). First, party dealignment divorces the congressional vote from the presidential for some voters. This weakens surge and decline effects, though there is no reason to believe dealignment is so extreme as to uncouple the two votes for a majority of voters. Second, although the increased incumbency advantage is still a matter in dispute (Erikson 1971; Jacobson 1987; Bauer and Hibbing 1989) , if true, it would be more difficult for any consideration, including those involving the presidential candidates, to influence congressional contests involving incumbents. However, again, incumbency advantages may not be so great that elections involving incumbents are entirely invulnerable to national forces.
Of the three possible reasons given for apparently weakening surge and decline effects, perhaps the most significant is the wasting of the presidential surge or coattails. Presidential coattails have appeared smaller in recent years in part because Republicans have been unable to take advantage of their presidential candidates' coattails in the South. In 1972, for instance, Nixon ran strongly in many southern congressional districts but Republicans left Democratic congressional candidates unchallenged in 35 southern congressional districts carried by Nixon, 22 of which Nixon carried with 70% or more of the vote. Undoubtedly, more districts could be added to this list in which Republicans mounted merely token candidacies.
The inability of Republicans to find quality candidates in these southern districts has not changed much since 1972. Bullock's (1988, Moreover, what has not been gained in the presidential surge cannot be lost in the midterm decline. In effect, the Republican party's inability to recruit quality congressional candidates in the South has muted the process of surge and decline. The full effects of surge and de-(Campbell forthcoming). Also, as expected, the interaction term for the midterm penalty variable indicated that the president's party has paid a smaller penalty since 1976. cline will not be seen until the South completes its transition from its local one-party system to a competitive two-party system.'
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